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Introduction
Since the 1992 publication by Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (MBMT) of
the Boston Federal Reserve study (‘‘the Boston Fed study’’), the issue of alleged
mortgage discrimination by lending institutions has received widespread press, and even
congressional, coverage. Regulatory and even Justice Department actions have been
predicated on its methodology: single-equation estimation of the probability of loan denial
as a function of borrower and property covariates, using logit or probit methods. Yet
considerable controversy over the adequacy of these methods persists. This paper reviews
these topics and develops an alternative methodology, reverse regression, which has been
used in measurement of gender discrimination in labor markets. Application of reverse
regression to the Boston Federal Reserve study dataset does not support contentions of
discriminatory behavior by Boston area lenders; if anything, it suggests reverse
discrimination.
Since passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 ( HMDA), researchers
have sought to use HMDA data to understand the geographic distribution of mortgage
credit. After 1989, when HMDA was amended and disaggregated data became available,
researchers have focused on the determinants of differential outcomes among ethnic
groups.
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Abstract.  The topic of mortgage discrimination has received renewed interest since
publication of the Boston Federal Reserve Bank study based on 1990 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act data. That study used traditional direct logistic regression to assess the
inﬂuence of race on the probability of mortgage loan denial and reported the parameter
estimate of race to be positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero across several model
speciﬁcations, thereby supporting contentions of discriminatory behavior. This paper
develops an alternate approach, reverse regression, a method often used in the measurement
of gender discrimination in labor markets. After discussion of theoretical issues regarding
model choice, results of a reverse regression on the Boston Federal Reverse Bank study
dataset are reported. Contrary to results using direct methods, reverse regression does not
support contentions of mortgage discrimination in the Boston mortgage market. Rather,
the lower overall qualiﬁcations of minority applicants are likely to account for disparities in
application outcomes. The plan of the present paper is as follows. First, the Boston Federal Reserve study is
described. Second, criticisms of it are presented and discussed. Third, the rationale for
use of an alternative approach, reverse regression, is developed. Fourth, results of applica-
tion of reverse regression to the Boston Fed data are presented. Finally, conclusions and
suggestions for further research are offered.
Boston Federal Reserve Study
The Boston Federal Reserve Study was undertaken in 1992 based on disaggregated
1990 HMDA data, augmented by survey data collected from Boston area lenders who
were required to submit HMDA data. Each lender was asked to provide additional
information on every application for credit made by blacks and hispanics during 1990
and for a random sample of 3300 applications made by whites. According to the Boston
Fed study, ‘‘Substantial lender cooperation resulted in a very good response rate and
high-quality data.’’1 In addition, denial rate disparities were representative of national
patterns; black and hispanic applicants had a 28% denial rate as compared to slightly
over 10% for whites. The aggregate denial rate was 14%.
The Boston Fed methodology applied direct regression methodology to the measure of
discriminatory lender behavior based on the following model of the mortgage loan
decision,
Prob (y51 ? X, z)5b9X1az1e, (1)
where y51, if the loan application is denied, X is a set of borrower, property and
neighborhood covariates, conceptually including all factors used in loan underwriting,
and z5an indicator variable for the presence of the attribute against which lenders may
discriminate; here z51 if applicant is black or hispanic, z50 otherwise. The variable e
represents an additional unobserved random error term. The parameter of interest, then,
is ‘‘a,’’ and a positive value signiﬁcantly different from zero is taken as a measure of
discriminatory lender behavior.
The covariates used in the Boston Fed study are deﬁned in Appendix 1. In the Fed
study sample, minority (black and hispanic) applicants differ from white applicants in a
number of respects. They tend to purchase less expensive properties, though those
properties were more likely to be multifamily dwelling units. In addition, they have
higher loan-to-value ratios and smaller net worth, relative to white applicants. Finally,
minority applicants have objectively worse credit histories, as measured by MORTPAY,
CONSPAY and PUBREC, and higher housing expenses and total debt burdens. On the
positive side, minority applicants are less likely to be self-employed than were white
applicants. (Lenders generally view income from self-employment as less stable than wage
income.)
It is also useful to compare rejected applicants to approved applicants. Rejected
applicants were more likely to be purchasing a multifamily dwelling unit, more likely to
be self-employed, had substantially worse credit histories, as measured by CONSPAY,
MORTPAY and PUBREC, and, ﬁnally, had higher ratios: higher housing expense-to-
income, total debt-to-income, and loan-to-value. Thus, we see an essential problem:
minority applicants appear to be systematically less qualiﬁed than are white applicants.
This difference in average applicant qualiﬁcations may be modeled by the reverse
regression procedure.
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VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, 1996The authors of the Boston Fed study conclude as follows:
The results of this study indicate that race does play a role as lenders consider
whether to deny or approve a mortgage loan application . . . the higher denial
rate for minorities in Boston is accounted for, in large part, by their having
higher loan-to-value ratios and weaker credit histories than whites. They are
also more likely to be trying to purchase a two-to-four unit property rather than
a single-family home. Nevertheless, after taking account of such factors, a
substantial gap remains. A black or Hispanic applicant in the Boston area is
roughly 60% more likely to be denied a mortgage loan than a similarly situated
white applicant.2
These conclusions are based on the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the dummy variable
for race included in the model. While the race variable is not the most important
determinant—denial of private mortgage insurance and public record credit defects have
much larger magnitudes, it is consistently positive and signiﬁcant (t-ratio of approx-
imately 5) across a number of model variations, according to MBMT.
The signs of parameter estimates are generally as expected. Higher housing expense
(HEXP), debt ratios (TOTDEBT), or loan-to-value (LTV) ratios increase the probability
of loan denial. Likewise, a poorer credit history (CONSPAY, MORTPAY), and
particularly public record (PUBREC) defects in borrower credit history increase the
likelihood of denial. Interestingly, net worth (NETW) seems to have little impact on loan
application outcome. On the other hand, being self-employed (SELF) or purchasing a
multifamily property (MFDU) does increase probability of denial. Finally, minority
status (RACE) does indeed increase the probability of denial, as concluded by MBMT.
Among all variables, denial of private mortgage insurance (PMI) has the greatest effect
on probability of loan denial, virtually assuring it; at least for the subset of the sample
requiring PMI (those with LTV greater than 80%).
Criticisms of Fed Study Methodology
The Boston Fed study has been criticized on a number of grounds. Zandi (1993) argued
that the study suffered from omitted variable bias since MBMT failed to include certain
binary variables such as ‘‘meets lender credit guidelines’’ in their ﬁnal model speciﬁc-
ation. Megbolugbe and Carr (1993) responded that judgmental variables such as ‘‘meets
credit guidelines’’ are themselves correlated with race and that, in fact, whites and
minorities will meet, or fail to meet, credit guidelines based on race. Liebowitz and Day
(1993) claim that (1) there are so many miscodings in the dataset as to make any
conclusions drawn from it doubtful, and (2) that a small number of highly inﬂuential
observations drive parameter estimate results on RACE. Megbolugbe and Carr (1993)
concur that there appear to be coding errors in the Fed study, identifying some ﬁfty-three
likely errors, but after a series of data scrubbing procedures, conclude that these errors are
not necessarily responsible for the positive coefﬁcient estimate on RACE. In addition,
Megbolugbe and Carr reestimated the Fed model after deleting the twenty-seven most
inﬂuential observations as well as the ﬁfty-three probable miscodes, yet found the
coefﬁcient on RACE still positive and highly signiﬁcant. LaCour-Little (1994) re-
estimated that Boston Fed model after deleting 252 suspicious observations. While the
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decline from 5.28 to 4.03; by most standards, these are still very robust results. The
difﬁculty with these sorts of discussion is, of course, that there really is no way to
objectively determine which observations are, in fact, miscodings that should be deleted.
Accordingly, in the empirical section of the paper that follows, I use the entire Boston
Fed dataset.
On a more theoretical basis, Rachlis and Yezer (1993) argue that single-equation
models of the mortgage lending process oversimplify complex phenomena and that
unbiased tests for discrimination require multiple equation models. Yezer, Phillips and
Trost (YPT) (1994) argue that single-equation models ignore several crucial issues. First,
since rational borrowers choose lenders so as to maximize their chances of loan approval
and lenders screen borrowers for the same reason, the ‘‘ﬁnal sample of approved
applicants is selected in a fashion that is certainly not random’’ (YPT, 1994, p. 197).
Second, they argue, borrowers take into account their own assessment of the probability
of default in selecting loan terms. This assessment is, of course, unobservable, yet
theoretically should enter into equations describing borrowers’ choice of loan terms and
lenders’ accept or reject decision. Thus, they argue, a sufﬁcient model of the mortgage
lending process must include at least three equations: borrowers’ choice of loan terms,
lender’s accept or reject decision, and borrowers’ default decision. Noting that ‘‘in most
cases the system of equations . . . is too complex to permit unambiguous analytical
results’’ (PTY, 1994, p. 205), they show by means of a Monte Carlo simulation the effects
of simultaneity and selection biases using a three-equation model. Results indicate that
the parameter estimate on minority status is biased upward, indicating discrimination
when none exists.
The argument in this paper, while consistent with YPT’s view that the single-equation
direct regression approach cannot accurately measure discrimination, is somewhat
different. I argue that even if the borrowers’ choice of loan terms and lender were
exogenous, under a reasonable proxy-variables model of the mortgage lending process,
direct regression will produce a biased estimate of the discriminatory effect. Moreover,
reverse regression will provide an unbiased estimate. By way of preview, when reverse
regression is applied to the Boston Federal Reserve data, the sign of the coefﬁcient
measuring discrimination changes, evidence for, if anything, reverse discrimination.
My purpose here is not to debate these issues further, so let us assume, for argument’s
sake, that loan terms are indeed exogenous and that evidence from direct regression, with
or without data deletions, suggests discriminatory behavior by mortgage lenders. What
does this imply? If lenders discriminate against minority loan applicants, then it is
reasonable to expect that they will tend to accept only the most qualiﬁed minority
applicants; that is, they will tend to resolve borderline cases against minority applicants
and the marginal minority loan applications will be better qualiﬁed than the marginal
white applicant. This notion, generalized, is sometimes expressed as follows: because of
discrimination, minorities must be better qualiﬁed in every way than whites, simply to
achieve similar outcomes.
Reverse Regression
An excellent overview of the relationship between direct and reverse regression appears in
Chapter 7 of Leamer (1978). Use of reverse regression as a method of measurement of
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discrimination case, gender discrimination in wages is often demonstrated by means of a
direct regression of wages on a vector of job qualiﬁcation variables plus a dummy
variable for female, with a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient on female taken as evidence of
wage discrimination against women. In contrast, Kamalich and Polacheck (1982) and
Conway and Roberts (1983) propose use of reverse regression in the measurement of
wage discrimination based on gender. For instance, Kamalich and Polachek argue that
‘‘If discrimination exists, one would expect to ﬁnd blacks and women to have higher
mean qualiﬁcations for any given wage level’’ and ‘‘a pattern of mixed positive and
negative coefﬁcients . . . is consistent with nondiscrimination.’’3 In the present case, we
shall see that the estimate of discriminatory effect produced by reverse regression is,
indeed, of the opposite sign as the direct regression estimate. Leamer (1978) shows
formally that in an errors-in-variables context, direct and reverse regression estimates
bound the true parameter value and that in a proxy-variables case, direct regression
produces an upwardly biased estimate whereas the reverse regression estimate is
unbiased.
Reverse regression methods have reportedly become common in class action litigation
over gender differentials in the past ﬁfteen years, partially because they will generally
produce different results than do the analogous direct regression, since the slope of
E(Y ?X) is not generally equal to that of E(X?Y). In particular, they may produce results
that indicate much less discrimination, perhaps none, than was suggested by direct
regression methods. In such cases, then, the measures of discrimination derived from the
direct and reverse regression will have the same sign, but the reverse regression coefﬁcient
will typically have a much smaller magnitude. By way of a preview, in the case at hand,
reverse regression coefﬁcients of discrimination are not merely smaller than those
obtained by direct regression, they are negative.
The labor market analogy to mortgage discrimination is fairly immediate. We observe
women to have, on average, lower salary levels than do men in comparable jobs and
speculate that discrimination may play a role. Upon further analysis we determine that
women have, on average, lower qualiﬁcations (as measured by education, years of
experience, etc.) than do men. What measurement technique is appropriate? Similarly in
mortgage markets, we observe minorities to have a lower approval rate on mortgage loans
than do white applicants but determine that they, too, seem to have, on average, lower
qualiﬁcation levels (worse credit, higher ratios) as well. How can these differences be
explained?
In certain cases, we may view reverse regression as a solution to an errors-in-variables
problem. The dependent variable is measured precisely (we know whether the application
was approved or denied or what actual salaries are) but measured covariates are, at best,
an incomplete set of proxies for qualiﬁcations. In general we wish to run the direct
regression,
y5b9X1az1e , (2)
where y5subject of interest (salary level or mortgage loan approval rates), X5a matrix of
measured qualiﬁcation covariates, and z5the attribute allegedly discriminated against
(gender or race). The variable e is a random error term with expectation of zero. In this
approach, ‘‘a’’ is used as the measure of discriminatory behavior. Since X is a series of
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the index means the applicant is less qualiﬁed, at least in the mortgage discrimination
case), and ‘‘y’’ can be measured precisely, we instead run the reverse regression of the
composite inverse qualiﬁcations index, q5b9X upon y and z,
q5cy+dz (3)
and then use 2d/c5a* as the measure of discriminatory effect.
Goldberger (1984) develops this approach in the wage discrimination case showing
that where measured covariates are merely imperfect proxies for qualiﬁcations, the direct
regression coefﬁcient estimator will be biased upward while the reverse regression
estimator will be unbiased. Goldberger further claimed that coefﬁcients obtained from
any individual reverse regression, that is, regression on a single qualiﬁcations proxy
variable, all must be proportional to one another to justify use of reverse regression.
Dempster (1988), while arguing that attempts to measure discrimination by either
method required a non-statistical foundation, showed that proportionality of coefﬁcients
was not, in fact, a prerequisite to use of reverse regression. Appendix 2 contains a proof,
following Goldberger, of the conditions under which the reverse regression estimator,
‘‘a,’’ is unbiased.
It may be objected at this point that the problem of mortgage discrimination does not
conform to salary discrimination in at least one very important regard: salaries are a
continuous variable whereas mortgage application outcome is binary. Consider, however,
the following model of the mortgage decision process. The lender implicitly assesses the
probability that the mortgage loan applicant will default on a loan. This assessment, call
it Y*, is the sum of the true default probability, p, and any discriminatory effect, az:
Y*5p1az , (4)
where z5an indicator of the applicant class allegedly discriminated against, i.e., z51 if
applicant is minority, z50, otherwise. Now Y* is a continuous variable on the unit
interval. If Y* is greater than some threshold, u, then the lender rejects the loan and we
observe Y51:
Y51, if Y*áu; Y50, if Y*¢u . (5)
Moreover, the probability of borrower default may, for a variety of reasons, be related to
z, but subject to a random error term:
P5mz1u . (6)
Finally, we have an imperfect set of indicators, X, of p:
X5gp+e . (7)
Estimation of a binary response model (logit or probit) will reveal [Y*?X]. We can then
form the inverse qualiﬁcations index q5b9X and estimate the reverse regression given
in (3).
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of a, the discriminatory effect we seek to measure.
Results of Reverse Regression
I begin this section with a review of the mechanics of the procedure. A report of results
using the Fed study dataset is then presented.
The ﬁrst step in reverse regression is to estimate a logit function of ACTION on the set
covariates used in the direct regression model (CONSPAY, HEXP, etc.) but without the
RACE variable. The results of that regression, together with the complete model
including RACE for reference purposes, are shown in Exhibit 1. Results from the Full
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Exhibit 1
Direct Logistic Regression Excluding Race*
Parameter Est-ACTION Parameter-Est



























-2 Log Likelihood: 1,745.7 1,718.7
Goodness of ﬁt: 3,088.7 3,135.4
Model Chi-square 688.2 715.3
Degrees of freedom: 11 12
Overall percent correct: 88.81% 89.05%
Number of observations: 2,932 2,932
*Dependent variable is ACTION (ACTION =1, if loan denied).
T-ratios are in parentheses beneath parameter estimates.Model show the parameter estimate of RACE to be .73 (t-ratio of 5.3).4 Given the logit
method, this means that minority status (RACE51) signiﬁcantly increases the odds of
loan turndown. Exact probabilities of turndown depend on the values of other variables
contained in the model. Given these, predicted probabilities of loan denial for each
observation based on the race-free regression equation also estimated are saved as part of
this ﬁrst step. These predicted probabilities may be viewed as a race-free inverse
qualiﬁcations index for each observation, hence are renamed Q-INDEX, an additional
variable now available for each observation. Keep in mind that higher values of the
inverse qualiﬁcations index mean the applicant is less qualiﬁed, i.e., the probability of
turndown is greater. The second step in the reverse regression uses ordinary least squares
to regress the inverse qualiﬁcations index, Q-INDEX, on the pair of binary covariates
RACE and ACTION. Results of this second step, the reverse regression, are shown in
Exhibit 2. The positive coefﬁcient of .057 on RACE reﬂects the excess qualiﬁcations
associated with minority status. Since, in this context, excess qualiﬁcations are negative
(i.e., the applicant is less qualiﬁed), we may interpret this quantity as the excess
probability of default required to turn down a minority loan applicant.
Exhibit 3 compares results of direct and reverse regressions. The key result is the
difference in signs between ‘‘a’’ and ‘‘a*’’. Under direct regression, minority status has a
negative impact on loan application outcome, i.e., increases probability of denial (‘‘a’’ is
positive). Again, in the logit framework, this operates through the odds ratio, i.e., the
actual increase in the probability of denial depends on levels of other variables, so the
typical OLS interpretation of the coefﬁcient is not appropriate. Under reverse regression,
however, minority loan applicants are shown to be approved with average qualiﬁcations
19% lower than white applicants (‘‘a*’’ is negative). Hence we cannot say that minority
loan applicants must meet a higher standard than white applicants; rather, the reverse
appears to be the case. One might argue that this constitutes reverse discrimination, since
some whites with objectively higher qualiﬁcations would have mortgage loan applications
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a* = 2.057/.296 = 2.196
*Dependent variable is Q-INDEX.
T-ratios are in parentheses beneath parameter estimates.denied while minorities with lower qualiﬁcations were approved. Why might such a result
occur? If lenders, fearful of charges of discrimination, consciously or unconsciously resolve
all borderline cases in favor of minority applicants, such a result is certainly possible.
To assess robustness of these ﬁndings, a hold-out procedure was employed. First, the
Boston Fed data was split randomly in half, using the ﬁrst half of the dataset to estimate
the parameters of Q-INDEX and the second half to compute the reverse regression, using
predicted Q-INDEX values. Results of the hold-out analysis are shown in Exhibit 4.
Parameter estimates are almost identical to those derived on the entire dataset, although
standard errors are slightly larger (and, accordingly, t-ratios smaller) as would be
expected using a smaller number of observations. The resulting value of a* is 2.224, very
similar to the 2.196 value derived from estimation using the entire dataset.
In summary, reverse regression has been shown to provide an alternative method for
assessing mortgage discrimination, just as it has in the labor market studies of gender-
based discrimination. In contrast to direct methods, reverse regression addresses a
distinct question: given outcomes, how do qualiﬁcations vary with race? The simple
answer is minority qualiﬁcations are systematically lower than white qualiﬁcations.
Conclusions
Reverse regression does not reinforce the contention that minority applicants were
discriminated against by Boston area lenders during 1990; it may, however, help explain
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Exhibit 3
Comparison of Direct and Reverse Regression Coefﬁcients
Variable Direct Reverse
a c d a*
z .73 .296 .057 2.193
Exhibit 4












a* = 2.064/.286 =2.224
T-ratios are in parentheses beneath parameter estimates.why minority turndown rates were twice those of the entire group. Race-free indices of
qualiﬁcations show minority loan applicants to have qualiﬁcations between 19% and 22%
lower than white applicants. Looking at the results another way, the lenders’ assessment
of default probability must be about 5.7% higher for lenders to reject a minority loan
applicant, as compared to a white applicant. In other words, lenders appear to apply less
stringent underwriting standards to minority loan applications; nonetheless, since
minority loan applicants are, on average, so much less qualiﬁed than white applicants,
average turndown rates are higher for minority applicants. This ﬁnding implies that
public policy might better focus, then, upon improving minority qualiﬁcations, rather
than ferreting out apparent discrimination, which may result merely from differential
qualiﬁcations.
The Boston Fed dataset is, of course, only a single sample from a particular geographic
market at a particular point in time. Whether we accept results of direct regression or
reverse regression, we should not infer that these results necessarily hold in all markets
over all time periods. Further research, in different markets and over different
timeframes, but also based on expanded HMDA data, will tend to conﬁrm or refute the
parameter estimates of the Fed study and variations on it.
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Appendix 1
Information on Boston Fed Study Data
Deﬁnition of Variables
Housing Expense to Income  A dummy variable indicating HEXP in excess of .30
(HEXP)
Total Debt to Income  The ratio of debt-to-income
(TOTDEBT)
Net Wealth  Applicant net worth
(NETW)
Consumer Credit History  Number of consumer credit late payments
(CONSPAY)
Mortgage Credit History  Number of mortgage credit late payments
(MORTPAY)
Public Record History  A dummy variable indicating presence of any
(PUBREC) public record defects in the applicant’s credit
history (e.g., a judgment or bankruptcy)
Probability of Unemployment  The unemployment rate in the applicant’s
(URIA) occupation
Self-Employment  A dummy variable indicating self-employment
(SELF)
Loan-to-Appraised Value  Loan-to-value ratio
(LTV)
Denied Mortgage Insurance A dummy variable indicating applicant was
(PMI) denied private mortgage insurance
Two-Four Family Property A dummy variable indicating purchase of a
(MFDU) multifamily property
Minority (Black or Hispanic) Status A dummy variable indicating whether the applicant
(RACE) is black or hispanicNotes
1Munnell, Browne, McEneaney, and Tootell (1992), p. 1. See also Browne’s response to Liebowitz
in September 21, 1993 Wall Street Journal letter to the editor.
2MBMT (1992), pp. 43–44.
3Kamalich and Polacheck (1982), pp. 450, 459.
4Perceptive readers will note that while the coefﬁcient on RACE is .73, the coefﬁcients on PUBREC
(an indicator of public record credit defects) and PMI (denial of PMI insurance) are even larger.
Plainly, lenders consider public record credit defects, such as judgments or bankruptcies, very
serious. The PMI effect is more complex. PMI is generally required for loans with LTVs greater
than 80%, so downpayment-constrained minority households are more likely to need PMI. The
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Appendix 2
Proof of Bias of Direct Regression Estimator
The following shows the bias of the direct regression estimator and the lack of bias in the reverse
regression estimator, assuming a multiple indicators model. Notation and  calculations closely
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and the discrimination coefﬁcient, a, is
a5a1(12p*)m , (14)
which is biased upward.









and a* is an unbiased estimator of a.Boston Fed study (1992, p. 32) speciﬁcally addresses this issue. Moreover, in the Appendix to the
Boston Fed study, Table B5 reports a separate analysis of the RACE effect in PMI denial. While
they ﬁnd a smaller, but still positive, RACE effect here, too, sample size is small (only 2.6% of all
loan applications were denied PMI). The role of PMI certainly deserves further study and offers an
interesting control case, since it is unlikely that PMI underwriters would ever have any direct
contact with the loan applicant; although they may be in possession of the loan application itself,
which does indicate race, it is hard to understand how racial prejudice might enter into their
decisions.
References
Conway, D. and H. V. Roberts, Reverse Regression, Fairness, and Employment Discrimination,
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, January 1983, 1, 75–85.
Dempster, A., Employment Discrimination and Statistical Science, Statistical Science, 1988, 3:2,
149–61.
Goldberger, A., Reverse Regression and Salary Discrimination, Journal of Human Resources, 1984,
19:3, 293–318.
Kamalich, R. and S. W. Polacheck, Discrimination: Fact or Fiction?, An Examination Using an
Alternative Approach, Southern Economic Journal, October 1982, 49, 450–61.
LaCour-Little, M., Mortgage Discrimination: The Boston Federal Reserve Study and Its
Detractors, unpublished working paper, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994.
Leamer, E., Speciﬁcation Searches, New York: John Wiley, 1978, Ch. 7.
Liebowitz, S., A Study That Deserves No Credit, Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1993, A14.
—— and T. Day, Mortgages, Minorities, and Discrimination, Working Paper, University of Texas
at Dallas, 1993.
Megbolugbe I. and J. Carr, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study on Mortgage Lending Revisited,
Journal of Housing Research, 1993, 4:2, 277–314.
Munnell, A. H., L. E. Browne, J. McEneaney, and G. M. B. Tootell, Mortgage Lending in Boston:
Interpreting HMDA Data, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper, 92–7, Boston,
Mass.: FRB, 1992.
Rachlis, M. B. and A. M. J. Yezer, Serious Flaws in Statistical Tests for Discrimination in Mortgage
Markets, Journal of Housing Research, 1993, 4:2, 315–36.
Yezer, A. M. J., R. Phillips and R. Trost, Bias in Estimates of Discrimination and Default in
Mortgage Lending: The Effects of Simultaneity and Self Selection, Journal of Real Estate
Finance and Economics, 1994, 9, 197–215.
Zandi, M., Boston Fed’s Bias Study Was Deeply Flawed, American Banker, August 19, 1993, 13.
The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Charles F. Manski, James D. Shilling,
and two anonymous referees who read earlier versions of this paper, while retaining
responsibility for any and all remaining errors.
12 THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 11, NUMBER 1, 1996